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Abstract—E-Scooters are changing transportation habits. In an
attempt to oversee scooter usage, the Los Angeles Department of
Transportation has put forth a specification that requests detailed
data on scooter usage from scooter companies. In this work, we
first argue that L.A.’s data request for using a new specification
is not warranted as proposed use cases can be met by already
existing specifications. Second, we show that even the existing
specification, that requires companies to publish real-time data of
parked scooters, puts the privacy of individuals using the scooters
at risk. We then propose an algorithm that enables formal privacy
and utility guarantees when publishing parked scooters data,
allowing city authorities to meet their use cases while preserving
riders’ privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
E-scooters are changing transportation habits. At the same
time, their increased usage is bringing new challenges such
as clogged side-walks and danger of injury to both riders
and pedestrians. In an effort to oversee and regulate scooter
companies and scooter use, Los Angeles proposed the Mobility
Data Specification (MDS) [1], which requires the scooter
companies to provide real-time data of scooter locations and
a historical view of all scooter operations.
The requirement to provide data according to MDS has
not been positively received by dockless scooter companies
and privacy advocates. The scooter companies argue that such
data gives city governments an ability to track individual trips,
which may have negative privacy implications for individ-
uals [2]. Advocacy groups, such as the Electronic Frontier
Foundation and the Center for Democracy and Technology,
have also expressed concerns about rider privacy [3] [4] and
requested information on how the Los Angeles Department of
Transportation (LADOT) intends to aggregate, de-identify, and
anonymize MDS data if it is to be made public. Overall, the
question of the data that is necessary for the scooter companies
to provide for the cities to oversee scooter usage, while at the
same time protecting privacy of riders, is highly contested.
Several cities in the US have implemented ad-hoc mech-
anisms to anonymize scooter data when sharing it publicly.
For instance, Louisville, KY [5] aggregates GPS locations at
three decimals for latitude and longitude, which equates to
aggregation at approximately a block level. Austin, TX [6]
replaces GPS coordinates with census tract IDs, and Min-
neapolis, MN [7] follows a similar approach but replaces GPS
coordinates with street centerline IDs. Yet, these approaches
fail to protect privacy [8].
Contributions: In this work we make three contributions
to the debate around the scooter data sharing.
• First, we argue that Los Angeles’s (LA) proposal for the
new MDS specification is not warranted (§IV). We do
this by showing that LA’s proposed data use cases can
be met using data that is already being published as
part of an existing specification called GBFS (which was
proposed in 2015 and is already implemented by most
scooter companies). We focus on two of LA’s main use
cases: determining the number of scooters operating in a
region and determining the distribution of scooters across
neighborhoods.
• Second, we show that the currently publicly available
GBFS data puts individual rider privacy at risk (§V).
We demonstrate that this data is susceptible to a trip
reconstruction attack, contrary to the claim by GBFS’s
creators that the data does not violate privacy of riders
and their trips [9].
• Third, we recommend changes to the MDS and GBFS
specifications by proposing an algorithm for publishing
scooter data with formal privacy and utility guarantees,
which could allow city authorities to meet their use cases
while preserving riders’ privacy (§VI). We provide a
preliminary analysis on the trade-offs between privacy
guarantees and possible utility goals of city authorities.
II. BACKGROUND: MDS AND GBFS
LADOT proposed MDS [1] in November 2019 as a stan-
dardized approach for mobility service providers to give trip
and event level information to the city and for the city to
regulate mobility service providers. The proposed use cases
include enforcing device cap limits, determining when scooters
are parked in illegal areas, ensuring equitable deployment of
devices across neighborhoods, and informing the city planners’
future capital investments and infrastructure planning [1].
This proposal contrasts with an existing General Bikeshare
Feed Specification (GBFS) [1], which has already been imple-
mented by most mobility companies [10]. GBFS specification
is designed to provide the status of a micro-mobility system at
the moment (e.g., the number and locations of scooters that are
currently unused). Its goal is to meet “data needs for oversight
and planning” while “protecting traveler privacy” [9].Accepted to Workshop on Technology and Consumer Protection 2020 (ConPro).
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The specification for GBFS [9] requires service providers
to publish certain data feeds as JSON files. Out of the 4
data feeds that are required, the one that is relevant for our
privacy discussion is free bike status.json, which provides a
near real-time information on the absolute location of all
currently parked scooters. The feed is updated every TTL
seconds. Although no specific value is recommended in the
specification, 60 or 300 seconds is used as the TTL in the
datasets we analyze.
MDS, in addition to requiring the implementation of GBFS,
also requires providing a historical view of all trips and events
related to the operation of scooters. The API specification
for MDS has three components, called Provider, Agency, and
Policy; each one with a different use case. Provider API is
to be implemented by mobility service providers, and gives a
historical view of all past trips and events on demand. Agency
API is implemented by regulatory agencies to provide end-
points that service providers must call to upload events in near
real-time (such as a trip starting or ending), and to provide
telemetry data (such as scooter location, speed, and heading).
Policy API is to be implemented by regulatory agencies to
enable them to publish machine-readable policies (such as
localized caps, excluded zones and speed restrictions), and
update the policies as needed. The Provider and Agency APIs
provide very granular trip- and event-level information to the
city authorities. The requirements of these two APIs are the
ones that have raised privacy concerns in MDS.
III. DATA COLLECTION AND ETHICS
For our experiments, we collected data from four scooter
companies (Spin, Bolt, Lyft and Bird) that publish GBFS data
feeds for their scooters in Los Angeles. For each company, we
identify the URL for its free bike status.json data feed, and
scrape this URL every TTL seconds. Spin, Bolt, and Bird use
a TTL value of 60 seconds, while Lyft uses 300 seconds. All
results presented are based on data we collected over 10 days
between 2019-11-09 and 2019-11-18.
Our goal is to show that there are privacy risks in imple-
menting the GBFS and MDS APIs as specified, and propose
a solution that works for both the scooter companies and the
regulatory agencies. Thus, we limit our work to the minimum
data collection and analysis necessary to show that the privacy
risks for data published under GBFS are not merely theoretical
possibilities but tangible risks. Consequently, we refrain from
associating trips to specific individuals except for trips we took
ourselves.
IV. USING GBFS TO MEET USE CASES
Here we show that GBFS already provides information
needed to meet the goals of LA’s two main use cases:
determining the number of scooters in operation and their
distribution across neighborhoods. We focus on these two use
cases out of the 11 listed by [1] because they form the basis
for many of the other use cases such as enforcing device caps,
guiding future capital investments based on distribution of
scooter usage and informing policy making. Studying other
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Fig. 1. Number of parked scooters for different companies during 2019-11-09
to 2019-11-18
use cases such as enforcing parking regulations is left as an
area of future work1.
A. Use Case 1: Determining the Number of Scooters
The first use case for which the City of Los Angeles requests
MDS data is to determine how many scooters are operating [1].
This helps the city enforce device cap limits per company for
a given area. We show that the GBFS specification already
includes data that can be used to closely estimate the total
number of scooters in operation.
Fig. 1 shows a time series of the number of parked scooters
for four companies: Bird, Lyft, Bolt, and Spin. The peaks in
these plots, which represent times of inactivity, can be used
to estimate the total number of scooters in operation.
LADOT permits each company to run 3,000 scooters,
with an additional 2,500 allowed in disadvantaged commu-
nities [11]. Based on Fig. 1, Spin, Lyft, and Bolt are well
below the 3,000 limit. For Bird, one needs to look at the
distribution of scooters to see whether the scooters beyond
the 3,000 count are deployed in disadvantaged communities
(the next use case).
B. Use Case 2: Determining Scooter Distribution
The other use case for MDS data that we analyze is the
distribution of scooters within LA neighborhoods. The goal
of the city could be to verify that scooters are operating only
in allowed regions or to verify scooters are being deployed
equitably across neighborhoods. The city of LA incentivizes
scooter companies to not only target tourist areas but also to
provide their services to less privileged city areas.
We claim the City of Los Angeles already has enough
data available in GBFS to meet this use case. We demon-
strate this by counting the number of parked scooters in
LA neighborhoods for a single GBFS data snapshot. To
1It would be interesting to examine whether the precision provided by
GPS coordinates is sufficient for use cases such as enforcing parking rules,
regardless of privacy.
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Fig. 2. Bird scooter distribution, Los Angeles, 2019-11-12 2:54am
determine neighborhood limits, we use shapefiles provided by
the City [12].
In Fig. 2 we show Bird’s scooter distribution on 2019-11-
12 at 2:54am. Bird was the first scooter provider in LA and
the one with the largest number of available scooters in the
city. We see three major areas where Bird favors deploying
scooters: Santa Monica - UCLA campus, LA Downtown -
USC campus, and Hollywood. That is, scooters are more
prevalent in areas frequented by tourists and students, and
less common in poorer areas. Therefore, this figure shows that
GBFS gives exactly the information needed for the use case
of determining scooter distribution across neighborhoods.
V. ATTACKS ON GBFS
We next show how the access to data in GBFS violates the
privacy of scooter users. We demonstrate this by reconstructing
trips using parked scooter data and clustering the trips to
identify interesting trips, which we then further investigate.
A. Reconstructing Trips
We use parked scooter data in GBFS to reconstruct trips,
showing that GBFS, despite publishing much less information
about scooters than MDS, does not protect the privacy of
scooter users.
We check the location of all parked scooters on a minute by
minute basis. If the location of a scooter changes, we record
the scooter’s last location and the last time it was this location
as the start location and start time of a trip, respectively. We
record the scooter’s new location and the first time it was
this location as the end location and end time of the trip,
respectively.
This process provides us a dataset of trips, including poten-
tially “fake trips” that may be due to a scooter being relocated
for maintenance or charging purposes. After looking at the
overall distribution of trip distances and durations, we filtered
out such potentially fake trips using a trip distance threshold
of 100 meters minimum (to filter out slight relocations of a
scooter) and a time duration threshold of 1 hour maximum (to
filter out relocations due to charging or maintenance)2.
We looked for specific trips as a means to validate our trip
reconstruction. To accomplish this without violating other peo-
ple’s privacy, we took scooter rides ourselves, and recorded the
time and location for both start and end points. We were able
to match the time and location of trips we took with a specific
record in the trip dataset, which we reconstructed using the
method described above. We are able to do this simply because
we have information regarding the time and location our trips
start and end at. This approach, in addition to validating our
reconstruction, demonstrates the risk of identifying trips by
other individuals when side information is available. Studying
how different sources of side information, which prior works
have shown are often easily available [13], [14], can be used
to match trips with individuals is an interesting area for future
work.
B. Identifying Visits to Interesting Destinations
Certain habits and preferences, although legal, are consid-
ered personal and private. GBFS data allows any member of
the public access to data related to these habits. We show how
we use clustering on the reconstructed trips to identify popular
destinations and learn about trips to specific places.
1) Detecting Interesting Spots by Clustering: We use clus-
tering to identify hotspots. The top clusters of parked scooters
indicate popular places to start and end a scooter ride. Such
statistics may not contain much private information if the
hotspot is an area such as a popular shopping destination,
which would obviously bring many scooters. Tracking an
individual scooter may be hard in these areas. However, if the
hotspots are near houses or other establishments, they may
help us infer the habits of individual users.
A basic attack begins by associating the start and end
locations of trips. Trips may end in a parking hotspot in a
public area or at a specific house or establishment. By finding
a cluster of trips ending at a person’s home, we can check
the start and end locations of those trips to find out where
the person is going to or coming from. Moreover, this data
includes timestamps, thus we can infer more information about
these trips. End points can be more sensitive than start points,
as people might need to walk a certain distance to find a
scooter before starting a trip, but they typically end a trip
at their exact destination.
We use the standard k-means clustering algorithm on the
start locations. By increasing the target number of clusters, we
can make each cluster quite small and concentrate it in a nar-
row geographic area, which we can use to identify particular
places. Fig. 3 shows the distribution of cluster sizes when we
have 100 clusters. Since large clusters may be popular public
parking areas, we concentrate on smaller clusters with about
10 trips, which may contain more interesting information. In
the 10 days of collected data from a company with a small
2More sophisticated techniques can be used to filter out fake trips but they
are not necessary for our proof-of-concept demonstration.
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Fig. 3. Distribution of 100 clusters on start locations, Spin
number of scooters, such as Spin, it is reasonable to assume
that a person takes a ride every day. Cluster 54, with size 8,
centering in [34.02019, -118.27633], is located directly next
to a marijuana dispensary. Below, we will explore trips to this
location.
2) Case Study: A Cluster Outside a Marijuana Dispensary:
Based on our clustering (see section V-B1), we identified a
marijuana dispensary near a university campus, located within
a 2km distance of the university campus and student housing
areas. The lack of other stores or apartments on the same block
as the dispensary, helps to identify the marijuana store as the
likely ride destination of nearby parked scooters.
In Fig. 4 we show Spin trips starting and ending close to
the dispensary between 2019-11-11 and -12. We focused on
two locations, i.e., (a) and (b), which are the end of a trip
followed by the start of a second trip a few minutes later. More
specifically, for (a) the trip ends at 2019-11-11 11:32am, and
resumes 5 minutes later. For (b) the trip ends at 2019-11-12
3:08pm and resumes 44 minutes later. In case (a), the time
difference between the end of the first trip and the start of the
second trip provides sufficient time to make a purchase, but is
short enough to suggest the same rider.
For ethical reasons, we do not check where the trip origi-
nates before a rider reaching the store, and where it ends after
a scooter user leaving the store, although doing so is possible
using the data.
Moreover, going beyond checking the starting location of a
trip, one can potentially correlate the trip start and end points
with specific riders using auxiliary data such as public records
for inhabitants of particular addresses.
One could also gain more confidence in the inferred trips
and their correlation to specific individuals through a longi-
tudinal study focusing on recurrent trips. In other words, a
malicious adversary could use the GBFS data to learn about
personal habits of particular individuals using the scooters.
C. Attacks without using scooter IDs
The trip reconstruction described in section V-A assumes a
scooter’s ID does not change over time, which is true for the
Spin dataset we used. Some companies, such as Bird, change
their scooter IDs frequently, despite the GBFS specifications
requiring IDs to be consistent over time. We explain why
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Fig. 4. Spin trips starting and ending in Jefferson Blvd. and Grand Ave.
between 2019-11-11 and 2019-11-12
the changes in scooter IDs may not be sufficient to prevent
privacy violations. We give a high-level description but leave
exploration of possible attacks as an area the future work.
The simplest method of attack is to find a scooter that
is isolated from other scooters either in time (it is the only
scooter that moved) or distance (it is in an isolated area). We
hypothesize this scenario can be generalized to the case of
multiple scooters. By using the general distribution of duration
and distance of scooter trips, we can build a probabilistic
model and compute possible matchings to track scooters over
time. The ground truth can be obtained from some datasets
whose IDs do not change. For example, we can train the model
on Spin data and then use it to predict trips on Bird data.
In summary, if locations of scooters are not reported in
a privacy-preserving manner, even without using stable IDs,
this type of attacks may succeed. That is why, in the next
section, we recommend using techniques with formal privacy
guarantees to report noisy, rather than precise locations, which
would increase the difficulty of privacy-violating inferences.
VI. GEO-INDISTINGUISHABILITY AS A POTENTIAL
SOLUTION
In this section we discuss one way to define location privacy
and a mechanism through which we can achieve this type of
privacy. We apply this mechanism a restricted set of MDS’s
use cases and evaluate its performance. In addition, we provide
suggestions for improving GBFS and MDS.
A. Definition and Mechanism
A basic technique to protect location privacy is to report a
noisy location. Intuitively, if two locations are close to each
other, it can be difficult to distinguish between them during the
observation. Geo-Indistinguishability (G-I) [15] is a popular
location privacy definition that provides protection to such
location pairs. Formally, for any two locations x and x′ with
a maximum distance R, the observation S of them is (, R)
indistinguishable if the following condition is satisfied:
Pr(S|x)
Pr(S|x′) ≤ e
R,∀R > 0,∀S, ∀x, x′ : d(x, x′) ≤ R
The definition is parameterized by the radius R and the
privacy loss parameter . Note that  contains the unit of
measurement, while the  in the traditional differential privacy
definition [16] does not. In this work, we choose kilometer
as the unit of measurement. For example, if we choose
R = 0.2,  = ln 4R = 5 ln 4, that means for any two locations
x and x′ which are within 0.2km, the probabilities of them
having the same observation S, Pr(S|x) and Pr(S|x′), the
ratio of the two probabilities is upper bounded by 4. Namely,
Pr(S|x) ≤ 4Pr(S|x′) and Pr(S|x′) ≤ 4Pr(S|x).
Algorithm 1 shows the basic framework of a mechanism
that achieves G-I. For implementation details, see Appendix
A.
Algorithm 1: Geo-Indistinguishability [15]
Input : , R, location (lat, lon)
Output: Noisy location (lat′, lon′)
1 Sample angle θ and length r according to , R.
2 Move the location (lat, lon) by (θ, r).
3 Output (lat′, lon′).
B. Utility Analysis
In this section we define utility and show that for reasonable
privacy parameters, a city can allow scooter companies to use
G-I and still satisfy its goals with only a moderate increase
in measurement error. We consider use cases discussed in
section IV: (1) total number of scooters within city limits, and
(2) scooter distribution by neighborhood, and evaluate these
use cases using publicly available scooter location data with
G-I.
We measure utility as the difference between the true
number of scooters within a bounded region and the perturbed
number of scooters within that region due to noisy location
reporting. A smaller difference reflects a better utility. Our
expectation is to see a utility drop as privacy guarantees are
increased. For example, more congested neighborhoods losing
scooters to lesser populated ones (use case 2), or scooters
leaving the overall city limits (use case 1).
To evaluate the impact of G-I on use case 1, we perturb
parked scooter locations for different values of radius R,
varying it from 0 to 1 km in increments of 0.05 km. The
repeat the procedure 100 times for each value of R, and
record the average number of scooters leaving LA boundaries.
Fig. 5 (left) shows the number of Bird scooters outside city
boundaries using a data snapshot corresponding to 2019-11-
12 02:54am. These scooters randomly moved to neighboring
cities, or even into the ocean. The figure shows that, as
expected, as the privacy guarantees (and hence the noise)
increase, the number of scooters incorrectly placed increases
in an upward linear trend.
To evaluate the impact of G-I on use case 2, we consider the
average number of scooters lost per neighborhood; in this case
108 neighborhoods. As Fig. 5 (right) shows, neighborhood loss
follows a similar upward trend as in use case 2, where adding
more noise results in higher error.
In the context of densely populated cities such as LA, a
radius R that is reasonably large and covers multiple blocks
can help obfuscate specific destinations. We pick 0.25 km as
the radius for our privacy protection, which is comparable
to two and a half blocks, and analyze how the algorithm
performs with this parameter. With  = ln 6R = 4 ln 6, in
Fig. 5 we see a total loss of 115 scooters (3%) (left), and
an average of 4 scooters lost per neighborhood (right). This
suggests that for reasonable privacy parameters the utility loss
is not catastrophic.
In addition to the above empirical analysis, we theoretically
calculate the utility provided by the values we chose for R and
. We plot in Fig. 6 the probability of a sampled noisy location
being within a certain distance from the true location. The
cumulative function F is given by the following equation [15]:
F(x) = 1− (1 + x)e−x
As the figure shows, about 50% of the noisy locations will
land within 250m of the true locations, while 99% of the noisy
locations will land within a 1 km distance. This implies that
in expectation, the parameters we picked in the mechanism do
not greatly change the true locations.
C. How should GBFS and MDS change?
Having demonstrated an approach towards publishing GBFS
data with privacy guarantees and reasonable utility loss, we
recommend the debate between scooter companies and the
cities be resolved by using rigorous state-of-art techniques for
privacy-preserving data publishing. GBFS data feeds could use
this mechanism to report the noisy locations of scooters, and
MDS requirements could be updated to remove the trip and
event level data requested in Provider and Agency APIs. The
Policy API does not require the service providers to publish
any data, so we do not recommend any changes to the Policy
API. Both sides of the debate, and, most importantly, the
riders, would benefit
if scooter companies would be willing to invest resources
in implementing privacy-preserving mechanisms, and cities
would be open to considering performing their analyses on
privacy-protected data.
VII. RELATED WORK
Privacy challenges of sharing location data have been
well-documented in the literature. For instance, Culnane et
al. [8] show the vulnerabilities of Melbourne’s public trans-
portation by identifying co-travelers and complete strangers
when considering the uniqueness of each record within the
dataset. Other datasets, such as the New York City taxicab
dataset [13] and geolocation data gathered by apps from
mobile devices [14], have been shown to have similar privacy
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risks. In addition, Bassolas et al. [17] show that sharing precise
user locations may carry privacy risks.
In the last two decades, researchers have demonstrated
approaches for mitigating the privacy risks of location data
sharing [15], [17], [18]. For example, the recent work of
Bassolas et al. [17] proposed a framework for analyzing the
hierarchical mobility structure of cities. In order to greatly
reduce privacy risks, their data of trip flows are anonymized
and aggregated. Primault et al. [18] provide a detailed survey
of the existing location privacy protection mechanisms.
In this work, we based our proof-of-concept solution ap-
proach on Geo-Indistinguishability [15], which is a definition
that aims to relax the notion of differential privacy for location-
specific use cases.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Our work demonstrates that the data fight between cities
and mobility data providers could benefit from adoption of
state-of-the-art privacy-preserving techniques. The adoption of
such techniques would require flexibility both from the side of
scooter companies and the cities. However, the result would
be increased privacy for the riders while providing cities the
ability to achieve their regulatory goals.
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APPENDIX
A. Geo-indistinguishability
In this section we talk about the details of generating the
noisy location. The privacy preserving algorithm 1 randomly
selects the angle θ uniformly. Then length r is drawn from
Laplace distribution. θ tells which direction we should go
and r represents the distance in that direction. With the pair
(θ, r), we move from the original location and obtain a noisy
location. In total, this pair is sampled from zero-centered polar
Laplacian.
D(r, θ) =
2
2pi
re−r
According to the analysis in [15], algorithm 1 using the above
sampling technique preserves (, R) Geo-Indistinguishability.
We sample r from the above distribution and sample θ uni-
formly from [0, 2pi]. Since we are working on geo-coordinates,
we need to use the following formula to compute the noisy
location (assuming Rearth = 6378.1km). Given latitude xlat
and longitude xlon for a location, the noisy latitude x′lat and
longitude x′lon can be computed by:
x′lat = arcsin(sinxlat cos
r
Rearth
+ cosxlat sin
r
Rearth
cos θ)
x′lon = xlon + arctan
cos rRearth − sinxlat sinx′lat
sin θ sin rRearth cosxlat
